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REGULATING ANTITRUST THROUGH
TRADE AGREEMENTS
ANU BRADFORD

ADAM CHILTON*

Antitrust law is one of the most commonly deployed instruments of economic regulation around the world. To date, over 130 countries have adopted
a domestic antitrust law. These countries comprise developed and developing
nations alike, and combined produce over 95 percent of the world's GDP. 1
Most of the countries that have adopted an antitrust law have done so since
1990.2 This period of significant proliferation of antitrust laws also coincides
with a notable expansion of international trade agreements, including the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the negotiation of
numerous bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These concurrent trends
are consistent with the view that antitrust regulation and trade liberalization
are complementary tools in governments' efforts to create and preserve open
and competitive markets. 3

&

* Anu Bradford is the Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization at the
Columbia Law School. Adam Chilton is a Professor of Law and the Walter Mander Research
Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School. We are particularly grateful to the leaders of
the DESTA project for sharing the texts of the Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with us
(www.designoftradeagreements.org/). We also acknowledge with gratitude the funding by the
National Science Foundation that supported the early data gathering effort (see NSF-Law

Social Sciences grants 1228453 & 1228483, awarded in September 2012). The coding was subsequently expanded with the generous support of the Columbia Public Policy Grant "Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?," awarded in June 2015, and
additional financial support from Columbia Law School. We owe special thanks to our large
team of research assistants who helped gather and analyze the data we employ in this paper. Full
acknowledgments can be found at www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org.

' Anu Bradford & Adam S. Chilton, Competition Law Around the World from 1889 to 2010:
The Competition Law Index, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 393 (2018).
2Anu Bradford et al., CompetitionLaw Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative Competi-

tion Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 J. EMPRICAL LEGAL STUD. 411 (2019).
s Our own recent empirical research confirms this positive relationship between trade openness and adoption of domestic antitrust laws. See Anu Bradford & Adam S. Chilton, Trade
Openness and Antitrust Law, 62 J.L. & ECON. 29 (2019).
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However, the relationship between antitrust law and trade policy has been
the subject of considerable academic and policy debate. In the academic debate on the topic, some scholars argue that free trade makes antitrust laws
redundant because foreign entrants will destabilize cartels, constrain dominant
companies, and undermine other anticompetitive practices.4 Other scholars argue that antitrust laws are still needed to ensure that firms in non-tradeable
sectors do not engage in anticompetitive practices 5 and to ensure that private
anticompetitive practices do not compromise the gains from dismantling barriers to trade.6 For instance, open trade may invite more collusion as companies can extract larger rents and better avoid detection when they operate
across the global marketplace. In addition, free trade is not sufficient to guarantee successful foreign entry if the market is foreclosed by exclusive distribution agreements. This was a major concern for American film and
automobile companies seeking to enter the Japanese market in the 1980s.
Even though trade barriers with Japan had been removed, American companies had a hard time penetrating the market as Japanese antitrust laws failed to
condemn exclusive distribution agreements that tied local retailers and consumers to domestic distributors.8 These examples suggest that trade liberalization may need to be complemented with antitrust laws to be effective.
In policy debates on the topic, governments have advocated for, and
adopted, different positions. Notably, the European Union has always perceived trade and antitrust as closely related policy instruments. Its own antitrust laws were initially enacted to complement the goal of establishing a
single market.9 The European Union's fear was that, without such laws, pri-

4 See, e.g., ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
(1989); Jagdish Bhagwati, The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: Departures from
Unified Exchange Rates (Special Papers in Int'l Econ. No. 8, 1968), ies.princeton.edu/pdf/
SP8.pdf; Richard Blackhurst, Trade Policy Is Competition Policy, in COMPETITION AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 253 (OECD 1991); Marc J. Melitz & Giancarlo I. P. Ottaviano, Market
Size, Trade, and Productivity, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 295 (2008); Damien Neven & Paul Seabright, Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: MODALITIES FOR COOPERATION 334 (Leonard Waverman, William S.
Comanor & Akira Goto eds., 1997).
s See, e.g., Timothy Besley, Nicola Fontana & Nicola Limodio, Antitrust Policies and Profitability in Non-Tradable Sectors, 3 AM. ECON. REV.: INSIGHTS 251 (2021).
6 See, e.g., Csilla Bart6k & Sebastien Miroudot, The Interaction Amongst Trade, Investment

COMPETITION

115 (Manfred Neumann & Jurgen Weigand eds., 2004); Massimo Motta

&

and Competition Policies (OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 60, 2008); Eric Bond, Trade Policy
and Competition Policy: Conflict vs. Mutual Support, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
Fabrizio Onida, Trade Policy and Competition Policy, 56 GIORNALE DEGLI ECONOMISTI E ANNALI DI ECONOMIA 67 (1997).
See Bond, supra note 6, at 130.
id.; F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY

$ See

(1994).
9 Eleanor M. Fox, EU and US Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION

POLICY 339, 340 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997); Roger D. Blair & D.
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vate companies could re-create trade barriers between Member States, such as
by deploying vertical agreements to reserve exclusive territories for different
distributors. For similar reasons, the European Union was a strong advocate
for incorporating antitrust rules within the scope of the WTO in the early
2000s.10 In contrast, the United States has endorsed the separation of trade and
antitrust law. For instance, the United States has expressed concerns that antitrust law would lose its exclusive focus on consumer welfare if it became
enmeshed with trade policy considerations. 1 This is one of the reasons that
the United States systematically opposed embedding antitrust regulation in the
WTO.12 The U.S. position ultimately prevailed in the WTO as antitrust law, as
well as other proposed new areas of regulation such as government procurement and investment policy, were removed from the trade body's negotiating

agenda in 2004.13
Despite the continuing debate over whether, and to what extent, antitrust
law and trade policy should be directly connected, one area where they have
been linked together in practice is the inclusion of antitrust provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). For example, even though the European
Union's efforts to tie antitrust law more closely within the multilateral trade
regime failed, the European Union has been able to make antitrust provisions
a common feature of its PTAs. 4 By offering preferential access to its vast
consumer market, the European Union has significant bargaining power over
its trade partners and is therefore in a position to set conditions for signing a
PTA. One of those conditions is typically the adoption of antitrust law. The
Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E. U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2497, 2502 (2013); Radostina Parenti, Fact Sheets on the European Union 2021-Competition
Policy, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 2020), www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/82/competi

tion-policy.
Io Anu Bradford, InternationalAntitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48
HARV. INT'L

L.J. 383 (2007).

" See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Principal Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy: Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy (Oct. 22,
1998), www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-enforcement-global-economy; Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and InternationalMarkets: Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in
the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111 (1996).
12 The United States argued that inclusion of antitrust within the WTO would risk politicizing
antitrust law and compromise its economic rationality and legal neutrality, which are critical
attributes of antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 11; Mario Monti, European
Comm'r for Competition Policy, Speech at European Competition Day: A Global Competition
Policy? (Sept. 17, 2002), ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_02_399.

13 Robert D. Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral
Trading System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 531 (2002); Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett & Patrick
Low, Beyond Tariffs: MultilaterizingNon-Tariff RTA Commitments, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 79, 94 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick

Low eds., 2009).

14 Thomas J. Doleys, Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the
Developing World, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 337 (2012).
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European Union's 1995 agreement to form a customs union with Turkey provides an illustrative example. In its Article 39, the agreement states that "Turkey shall ensure that its legislation in the field of competition rules is made
compatible with that of the European Community .... "I5 To comply with this
provision, Turkey adopted an EU-style antitrust law in 1994, in the midst of
its trade negotiations with the European Union.16
But the European Union is not alone in thinking that antitrust and trade go
hand in hand. Even a cursory overview of PTAs suggests that a wide range of
governments from around the world-from Australia to Uzbekistan and from
Armenia to Vietnam-have chosen to include a requirement that the trading
partner must adopt or maintain domestic antitrust laws. 7 While the precise
reasons for these requirements likely vary, it suggests that many governments
consider antitrust law to be necessary or beneficial for realizing the gains from
the trade agreement.
Various scholars have acknowledged the presence of antitrust law in trade
agreements, and have pursued research to examine the implications of this
trend. 18 Oliver Solano and Andreas Sennekamp's research was one of the first
attempts to quantitatively examine antitrust provisions in a large sample of
PTAs. 19 The authors focus on a sample of 86 PTAs, which were notified to the
WTO Secretariat between January 2001 and July 2005 and which contained a
specific chapter on antitrust.20 They collect information on the type of antitrust
provisions included in the PTA, provisions on cooperation and coordination
between parties on antitrust matters, as well as whether any such antitrust
provision is subject to enforcement though a dispute settlement system species Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on imple-

menting the final phase of the Customs Union, 1996 O.J. (L 35) 1, art. 39 (Feb. 13, 1996).
16 The Act on the Protection of Competition (The Act No. 4054) (Dec. 13, 1994) (Turkey).
'7

See discussion infra Part IIA.

18 UNITED NATIONS, COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOw TO
ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS (Philippe Brusick, Ana Maria Alvarez & Lucian Cernat eds.,

&

2005); Gabriel Castafeda, Competition Policy and Economic Integration in NAFTA and
MERCOSUR, 26 INT'L Bus. LAW. 496 (1998); Richard O. Cunningham & Anthony J. LaRocca,
Harmonization of Competition Policies in a Regional Economic Integration, 27 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 879 (1996); Timothy M. Reif & Gary E. Bacher, Trade Laws, AntitrustLaws, and the
Process of Economic Integration, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 927 (1996); Terence P. Stewart
Timothy C. Brightbill, Trade Law and Competition Policy in Regional Trade Arrangements, 27
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 937 (1996); Bernard Hoekman, Competition Policy and Preferential

Trade Agreements (World Bank & Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Rsch., Working Paper No. 18875, 2002),
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.570.2407&rep=rep1&type=pdf;
Christopher
Garrett Lehrer, Note, Ensuring Competition Law Enforcement Under InternationalTrade Agreements, 26 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 449 (2017).
19 Oliver Solano & Andreas Sennekamp, Antitrust Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements

(OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No. 31, 2006).
20 Id. In addition, the Solano & Sennekamp sample includes some unnotified agreements,
which are included because of their "importance to trade" and the relevance of their antitrust
provisions.
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fied in the PTA. Their analysis suggests PTAs incorporate antitrust provisions
primarily to support trade liberalization. The PTAs frequently include clauses
such as "anti-competitive practices can undermine the trade objective" or emphasize how the goal of the PTA is "to combat anti-competitive behavior [in
order to] enhance the trade objectives of the agreement."
Several other projects have built on Solano and Sennekamp's research by
studying antitrust provisions in different samples of PTAs. For instance, Robert Anderson and Simon Evenett assessed whether antitrust provisions embedded in PTAs affect cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 2 Their analysis is
more extensive than that of Solano and Sennekamp as they also collect information on various sector-specific PTA chapters (such as chapters on financial
services or telecommunications) that are not antitrust-specific but often contain additional antitrust provisions.2 2 In line with Anderson and Evenett, Robert Teh studied "all competition-related provisions" in 74 PTAs and also
found that antitrust provisions often fall outside the PTAs' antitrust chapters
and are included in sector-specific chapters. 23 D. Daniel Sokol complemented
this research by focusing on the antitrust chapters in PTAs signed by Latin
American countries. His sample consisted of 36 PTAs signed between 1992
and 2006 that are included in the Organization of American States' trade
database.2 4 Sokol's primary finding is that all 24 Latin American PTAs with
an antitrust chapter exclude those chapters from the PTAs' dispute settlement
mechanism, suggesting that antitrust commitments are weak due to their nonenforceability.2 s Finally, Anu Bradford (one of the authors of this article) and
Tim Buthe analyzed a random sample of 182 PTAs from a near comprehensive list of post-World War II PTAs compiled by Andreas Dur, Leonardo
Baccini, and Manfred Elsig,2 6 and examined governments' main motivations
for including antitrust provisions in the PTAs. 27 Their analysis suggests that
antitrust provisions reflect governments' attempts to promote effective anti-

21 Robert D. Anderson & Simon J. Evenett, Incorporating Competition Elements into Regional Trade Agreements: Characterization and Empirical Analysis 29 passim. (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
22 Id.
23 Robert Teh, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL RULES IN
THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 418 (Anti Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen & Robert Teh eds.,

2009).
24 D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Antitrust Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CH.-KENT L. REV. 231, 253

(2008).
25

Id.

26 See Andreas Dtir, Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, The Design of International Trade
Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, 9 REV. INT'L ORGS. 353 (2014).
2? Anu Bradford & Tim Bdthe, Competition Policy and Free Trade: Antitrust Provisions in
PTAs, in TRADE COOPERATION: THE PURPOSE, DESIGN AND EFFECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE

AGREEMENTS 246 (Andreas Dfir & Manfred Elsig eds., 2015).
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trust law and trans-governmental regulatory cooperation, and that this concern
seems to dominate any concerns of discriminatory enforcement of antitrust
law.
This article builds on this empirical scholarship by introducing a novel
dataset of antitrust provisions in 596 international trade agreements signed
between 1945 and 2010. To build this dataset, we acquired a large sample of
PTAs from a research group studying international trade agreements. 28 We
then worked with a group of law students to comprehensively document the
provisions included in these agreements related to antitrust law. This article
first explains the construction of this new dataset and then uses the data to
provide what we believe to be the first systematic overview of the presence of
antitrust provisions in international trade agreements.
Through this analysis, we document several important new facts about the
presence of antitrust provisions in trade agreements. First, we investigate how
many PTAs in the dataset have provisions that directly address antitrust law.
We find that roughly 51 percent of the PTAs have either a chapter or an
article devoted to antitrust. Second, for these PTAs that have an antitrust
chapter or article, we examine the specific areas of antitrust law that those
agreements cover. We find that while over 75 percent of these PTAs address
antitrust issues related to dominance, cartels, and vertical agreements, only a
small fraction (i.e., 9 percent) specifically address mergers. Third, we show
that antitrust provisions tend to be more enforceable than often expected, with
71 percent of PTAs containing an antitrust chapter or article extending the
PTA's dispute settlement mechanism to those provisions. Fourth, our analysis
shows that while non-discrimination of foreign companies in antitrust matters
is sometimes addressed in the PTAs, it is more common for the parties to
promote regulatory cooperation through PTAs. More specifically, 35 percent
of PTAs with an antitrust chapter or article call for non-discriminatory treatment in antitrust matters while 94 percent of such PTAs commit the parties to
some form of regulatory cooperation in antitrust matters. Finally, we document differences in how the European Union and the United States have used
PTAs to export antitrust law around the world. We find that the European
Union signed dramatically more PTAs with antitrust chapters or articles as
compared to the United States, but also that 63 percent of PTAs with antitrust
chapters or articles include language that is distinctive of EU laws. In contrast,
only less than 1 percent of PTAs with antitrust chapters or articles include
language that is distinctive of U.S. laws. This suggests that, unlike the United
States, the European Union frequently deploys PTAs as a tool to export its
antitrust laws.

28 See Dfir et al., supra note 26.

2021]

REGULATING ANTITRUST THROUGH TRADE AGREEMENTS

109

The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the universe of PTAs included in our dataset and our method for documenting the antitrust provisions
in those agreements. Part II analyzes these data to illustrate several trends in
the way PTAs have incorporated antitrust law. This includes examining the
number of PTAs that have incorporated antitrust concerns into trade agreements and exploring the areas of antitrust law that are covered in those agreements. This Part also discusses the extent to which PTAs have been deployed
as vehicles to export antitrust laws by the European Union and the United
States, thereby contributing to the diffusion of antitrust laws around the world.
Part III concludes with an invitation for other researchers to build on the analysis in this article by using these new data for their own research.

I. THE DATASET
We begin by introducing the dataset we created to examine antitrust provisions embedded in PTAs signed from 1945 to 2010. For our sample of PTAs,
we relied on what we believe to be the most comprehensive database of trade
agreements: the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database. 29 Our analysis includes 596 PTAs that were in the DESTA database at the time we
launched our project. 30 (Since we commenced our project, however, the
DESTA database has expanded to include over 700 PTAs.) The post-World
War II period saw a great expansion in regulating global trade, beginning with
the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by 23
countries in 1947. This sample allows us to capture 65 years of international
trade treaties, from before the signing of the GATT in 1947 to after the entry
into force of the WTO in 1995.
To illustrate the data, Figure 1 graphs the number of PTAs signed from
1945 to 2010. Figure 1 depicts both the total number of PTAs in the updated
DESTA dataset and also the 596 PTAs in our sample. As Figure 1 shows,
there is a sharp increase in the number of PTAs that were signed after 1990.
This is not only the same time period during which there were major changes
in international trade law-most notably, the creation of the WTO-but also a
time that saw a dramatic increase in the number of antitrust regimes adopted
around the world. 31

29 Id. More information is available at www.designoftradeagreements.org/.
30 We are grateful to the leaders of the DESTA project for sharing the texts of the PTAs with

us.
31 See Bradford et al., supra note 2.
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FIGURE 1:
TOTAL NUMBER OF PTAS SIGNED FROM 1945 TO 2010
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Figure 2 further illustrates the data by depicting the number of PTAs signed
by country by 2010. For Figure 2, we code a country as having signed a PTA
if it either signed a PTA directly or if it was a member of a regional organization that signed a PTA on behalf of the members. Figure 2 shows that the
European Union has signed a large number of PTAs, but that several countries
around the world have also been active signers of PTAs. The phenomenon of
signing PTAs is thus not concentrated in just one jurisdiction or region.
FIGURE 2:
TOTAL NUMBER OF PTAS SIGNED BY COUNTRY BY 2010
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We developed a survey instrument with a series of detailed questions to
gather information on each of those PTAs, extending a sample of 186 PTAs
analyzed earlier based on the same survey. 32 The survey asked a range of
questions on the extent of antitrust obligations that the PTA imposes on the
parties to the agreement. For example, the survey asked whether the PTA has
a chapter, article, or other provisions containing antitrust obligations. The survey also asked whether those antitrust chapters or articles specifically require
the parties to adopt or maintain an antitrust law or an antitrust enforcement
agency. It further asked whether the PTA includes various antitrust obligations (e.g., provisions on cartels, vertical agreements, monopolization, and
mergers). Additionally, it asked whether any antitrust provisions are subject to
the dispute settlement mechanism established by the PTA.
The survey also asked questions relevant to the relationship between antitrust and trade, as well as any provisions on regulatory cooperation in antitrust
matters between parties. In particular, we sought to capture if treaty parties
explicitly identify anticompetitive practices as a non-trade barrier or, alternatively, identify discriminatory antitrust enforcement as a concern that can impede trade. As part of these questions, we inquired about whether the
countries impose classic trade obligations relating to non-discriminationnamely a "national treatment" or a "most favored nation" obligation-to govern their respective antitrust enforcement regimes.3 3 The questions we asked
on regulatory cooperation examined if the parties undertook commitments relating to, for example, consultation, exchange of information, transparency, or
establishment of joint working groups, or a common authority to resolve any
antitrust issues that arise between parties. Finally, in order to study whether
PTAs are used as tools to export antitrust laws by leading jurisdictions, we
also asked about the language used to describe antitrust provisions in antitrust
chapters and articles by considering whether any such provisions resemble
antitrust laws of the United States or the European Union.
To complete the analysis of the PTAs using this survey, we recruited and
trained a team of students who reviewed the PTAs and answered the detailed
questions in our survey. Each PTA was assigned to two researchers who independently answered all the survey questions, and any discrepancies were resolved by a third researcher consulting us in all instances where there was
doubt on the correct interpretation. The output of this discrepancy review produced a final, "consensus" response to every field for every PTA.

32 Bradford & Bfithe, supra note 27.

33 Such provisions would be aimed at curtailing any efforts to deploy antitrust laws unevenly
to favor either a government's own companies (which is prohibited by a "national treatment"
requirement) or to favor the companies of certain trading partners (which is prohibited by a
"most favored nation" requirement). See discussion infra Part ILB.
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To facilitate additional research by other authors, the complete dataset
and the accompanying codebook are freely available for download at
www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org. We should also note that our unit of
analysis for these data is at the individual PTA level, but the dataset can easily
be converted to a country-year format. This allows identification of all PTA
obligations that are valid for each country in each year. 34 This way of deploying the data can be helpful for many research applications, including our
earlier work that used this dataset while examining whether countries use
trade liberalization and antitrust regulation as substitutes or complements.35

II. RESULTS
We now use this dataset to explore the inclusion of antitrust law in PTAs.
We specifically use the dataset to explore three topics. First, we examine how
many PTAs in the dataset have provisions that directly address antitrust law.
Second, for the PTAs that do address antitrust law, we examine the specific
areas of antitrust law that those agreements cover. We also report the different
ways these PTAs seek to curtail antitrust protectionism or promote regulatory
cooperation between parties. Third, we document differences in how the European Union and the United States have used PTAs to export antitrust law
around the world.

A. PTAs

THAT ADDRESS

ANTITRUST LAw

We begin by exploring whether the PTAs in our sample address antitrust
law. Our dataset specifically documents whether each PTA includes a chapter
on antitrust law or an article on antitrust law: an antitrust chapter typically
contains multiple articles and hence indicates a more extensive discussion of
antitrust law in the PTA, whereas an antitrust article indicates a more abbreviated consideration of antitrust. The first PTA with an antitrust law chapter was
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and the first PTAs with
antitrust law articles were the European Free Trade Agreement and the Central American Common Market Treaty in 1960.
Figure 3 graphs the cumulative share of PTAs signed by a given year between 1945 and 2010 that include either a separate antitrust law chapter or a
separate antitrust law article.3 6 The results show that roughly 51 percent of
PTAs in the dataset (302 of 596) have a section-either a chapter or articledirectly addressing antitrust law. More specifically, by 2010, 19 percent of
PTAs included a separate antitrust law chapter (110 in total) and 32 percent of

34 See Bradford & Chilton, supra note 3.
3s

Id.

36 These are mutually exclusive variables: PTAs may either have an antitrust chapter or anti-

trust article, but not both.
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PTAs included a separate antitrust law article (192 in total). An additional 16
percent of PTAs (95 in total) contain some discussion of antitrust issues without dedicating a separate chapter or article to the topic. However, as these
provisions vary in content, and can be very trivial in the extent to which they
address antitrust law, the discussion below focuses on PTAs that dedicate either a chapter or an article to antitrust law.
FIGURE 3:
CUMULATIVE SHARE OF PTAS THAT HAVE AN
ANTITRUST CHAPTER OR ARTICLE
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Many of the PTAs that include a separate antitrust chapter or antitrust article also include a requirement that the parties take certain steps to regulate
antitrust. Figure 4 graphs the cumulative share of PTAs signed by a given year
between 1945 and 2010 that include a requirement for each party to maintain,
or adopt, a domestic antitrust law. It shows that these requirements began to
appear in 1957 with the treaty establishing the European Community. These
requirements became even more common starting in 1990. By 2010, nearly 30
percent of PTAs included an antitrust law requirement. Additionally, Figure 4
graphs the cumulative share of PTAs that include a requirement for each party
to establish or maintain a distinct antitrust agency. These requirements became more common in the 1990s. By 2010, 10 percent of PTAs included a
requirement for the parties to the agreement to establish, or maintain, an
agency dedicated to antitrust law.
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FIGURE 4:
CUMULATIVE SHARE OF PTAS THAT HAVE AN
ANTITRUST LAW OR AGENCY REQUIREMENT
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COVERAGE OF ANTITRUST LAW CHAPTERS AND ARTICLES

We next examine the specific substance covered in the antitrust law chapters and articles included in PTAs. Of the PTAs in our sample with an antitrust chapter or antitrust article, Figure 5 graphs the share that contain antitrust
law provisions concerning four areas of antitrust law: dominant companies or
monopolies ("dominance"); cartels or cartel-like agreements ("cartels"); anticompetitive vertical agreements ("vertical agreements"); or mergers and acquisitions ("mergers"). As Figure 5 shows, the share of agreements that
include provisions on dominance, cartels, and vertical agreements has remained consistently high. Cumulatively by 2010, of the PTAs with antitrust
law chapters or articles, 89 percent address dominance, 78 percent address
cartels, and 75 percent address vertical agreements while 74 percent address
all three of these topics. Mergers, however, are less frequently covered in
PTAs; merely 9 percent of PTAs include provisions that specifically address
mergers. The paucity of merger provisions is likely explained, in part, by the
late adoption of merger control by the European Union. The absence of
merger regulation in the European Union prior to 1990 makes it unlikely that
such provisions were deployed by the European Union (or jurisdictions emulating the European Union) in their PTAs. Finally, only 7 percent of PTAs
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address all four of these areas-dominance, cartels, mergers, and vertical
agreements-of antitrust law.
FIGURE 5:
TOPICS COVERED IN PTAS: AREAS OF ANTITRUST LAW
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In addition to including provisions about the substantive areas of antitrust
law, many PTAs also include provisions stipulating how foreign firms should
be treated by domestic antitrust authorities. In trade agreements, such obligations relate to non-discrimination of foreign companies as compared to domestic companies ("national treatment" obligation) or non-discrimination of
some foreign companies as compared to other foreign companies ("most favored nation" obligation). Of the PTAs in our sample with an antitrust chapter
or antitrust article, Figure 6 graphs the number of PTAs that include national
treatment provisions and the number of PTAs that include most favored nation provisions for the enforcement of antitrust law. 37 As Figure 6 shows, the
inclusion of these kind of provisions in PTAs has been fairly stable over time.
Cumulatively, national treatment provisions related to antitrust law are found
in 35 percent of PTAs and most favored nation provisions related to antitrust

3 Figure 6 graphs the "national treatment" and "most favored nation" clauses that are specifically about antitrust law; the PTAs may also include these clauses about other topics, such as the
treatment of foreign goods or investments.
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law are found in 27 percent of PTAs. These provisions often, but not always,
go hand-in-hand: 65 percent of PTAs contain neither of these provisions, 27
percent of PTAs contain both of these provisions, and just 8 percent of PTAs
contain one of the two provisions. The share of PTAs that include these provisions has been fairly stable over time, and these provisions are still included in
only roughly a third of the PTAs that regulate antitrust law.
FIGURE 6:
TOPICS COVERED IN PTAS: MOST FAVORED NATION
AND NATIONAL TREATMENT
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Many PTAs also stipulate how the parties to the agreement should cooperate in their enforcement of antitrust law. Because anticompetitive conduct can

cross national boundaries and is often subject to enforcement in multiple jurisdictions, cooperation among antitrust agencies has become a key feature in

antitrust enforcement. 3 8 In the absence of a supranational antitrust law or a
joint enforcement institution, regulatory cooperation offers a way to preempt

atSee, e.g., Bilateral Relations on Competition Issues, EUR. Com'N, eC.europa.eu/competi
tion/international/bilateral/ (cooperation agreements in competition policy signed by the European Union) (last visited May 6, 2021). These regulatory cooperation agreements include the
1995 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 1995 O.J.
(L 95) 47-52 (Apr. 27, 1995).
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enforcement conflicts and facilitate cooperation and convergence on a voluntary basis.
Antitrust cooperation comes in many forms. Parties may, for example,
agree to notify the firm's home government once an enforcement action has
been launched, or they may commit to exchanging information on cases with
a cross-border element or on enforcement more generally. Parties may also
agree to undertake "negative comity" or "positive comity" obligations-"negative comity" refers to parties agreeing to take the interests of the other parties
into consideration before taking action that might affect those other parties
and "positive comity" refers to parties agreeing that they can request the other
party to take affirmative action to help the requesting party enforce its laws.
Parties may also agree to extend technical assistance to help the other party to
finance antitrust enforcement activity or build regulatory capacity. Other provisions include parties agreeing to consult one another on antitrust law matters
or to establish working groups, study groups, or committees to discuss antitrust matters. More extensive commitments include establishing a common
authority to handle antitrust enforcement or the pursuit of voluntary convergence, harmonization, or uniformity in their antitrust policies. 39
Figure 7 reports the cumulative share of PTAs in the sample with antitrust
chapters or articles that mentioned any of these nine common forms of cooperation: Negative Comity, Technical Assistance, Convergence, Positive Comity, Notification, Common Authority, Information Exchange, Consultation,
and Working Group. As Figure 7 shows, there is considerable variance in the
extent to which these different forms of cooperation are addressed in PTAs.
Negative Comity requirements are present in the antitrust law chapters or articles of only 4 percent of PTAs. Technical Assistance requirements are also
relatively uncommon in that they are present in 8 percent of PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles. Convergence requirements are present in 9 percent of PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles.
Other obligations relating to antitrust cooperation are more common. Positive Comity provisions are present in 25 percent of PTAs with antitrust law
chapters or articles. Notification provisions are present in 26 percent of PTAs
with antitrust law chapters or articles. Common Authority provisions are pre-

s9 Common authority refers to an agency or some other type of institution, organization, or a
joint body that has the authority to make decisions on antitrust matters arising under the PTA.
For example, Article 171 of the 2001 revised Caribbean Community (CARICOM) treaty called
for the creation of a competition commission ("For the purposes of implementation of the Community Competition Policy, there is hereby established a Competition Commission (hereinafter
called "the Commission") having the composition, functions and powers hereinafter set forth.").
See, e.g., Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the
Caricom Single Market and Economy, July 4, 1973, caricom.org/documents/4906-revisedtreaty-text.pdf.
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sent in 29 percent of PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles. Information
Exchange and Consultation provisions are present in 40 percent of PTAs with
antitrust law chapters or articles. And provisions establishing Working Groups
are found in 88 percent of PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles. Overall, among the PTAs with an antitrust chapter or antitrust article, 94 percent
contain a reference to at least one form of such cooperation. While there is
heterogeneity in the specific forms of cooperation that the PTAs promote,
these data suggests that regulatory cooperation may be a key motivation for
governments to address antitrust through trade instruments.
FIGURE 7:
COOPERATION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW
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Many scholars have argued that international treaties are often weak or soft
instruments. 0 Similarly, some existing studies suggest that antitrust provisions in PTAs manifest this weakness due to their non-enforceability via dispute settlement. We therefore examined whether this is true with respect to
our sample of PTAs. We find that many PTAs that regulate antitrust law also
specify that antitrust law issues can be raised through the agreements' dispute

40 See, e.g., George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
4" See Sokol, supra note 24.

2021]

REGULATING ANTITRUST THROUGH TRADE AGREEMENTS

II9

settlement mechanisms. Figure 8 graphs the share of PTAs with antitrust law
articles or chapters that extend the PTA's dispute settlement mechanism to the
conflicts related to the regulation and enforcement of antitrust law arising
under the agreement.42 Cumulatively, these provisions were found in 71 percent of the PTAs that address antitrust law. While we do not analyze whether
a particular PTA's dispute settlement mechanism is strong or effective, our
analysis suggests that the parties often treat any antitrust provisions they negotiate within the trade agreement as serious and enforceable commitments.
FIGURE 8
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS THAT APPLY TO
ANTITRUST LAW PROVISIONS
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COMPARING THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

The European Union and the United States have been the most important
regulators of antitrust law around the world. However, recent research suggests that a majority of countries that have adopted antitrust regimes have
more closely emulated EU antitrust law than U.S. antitrust law. 43 Although
42 We also counted the PTA's dispute settlement system as applying to antitrust law provisions in instances where the dispute settlement applied to the entire agreement or in instances
when antitrust provisions were not exempted from the dispute settlement mechanism's scope.
as Anu Bradford et al., The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over American
Antitrust Law, 16 J. EMPRICAL LEGAL STUD. 731 (2019).
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there are several factors that have contributed to this development, one of
those factors is likely the European Union's common practice of deploying
trade agreements to promote antitrust policy. As noted earlier, the United
States has historically resisted linking trade and antitrust policies.
To illustrate, Figure 9 reports the share of PTAs that included either the
European Union or the United States as a party to the agreement. 4 The first
PTA in our dataset that includes the European Union is the Treaty Establishing the European Community of 1957, and the first PTA that includes the
United States is the Canada-United States Automotive Products Trade Agreement of 1965. As Figure 9 reveals, the European Union has been a more
active signatory of PTAs. The European Union is a party to 12 percent of the
PTAs in the dataset (91 in total). In contrast, the United States is a party to
only 2 percent of the PTAs in the dataset (18 in total).
FIGURE 9:
PTAS THAT INCLUDE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
UNITED STATES
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members at the time of the agreement. There are no other PTAs in the dataset that were signed
by just a subset of EU members.
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The gap is even wider, however, among the PTAs that include antitrust law
chapters or articles. The treaty establishing the European Community of 1957
included an antitrust chapter, but the United States did not include antitrust
law in its PTAs until much later: the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 was the first U.S. PTA to include an antitrust law article and the
North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 was the first U.S. PTA to
include an antitrust law chapter. Of the PTAs in our sample that include antitrust law chapters or articles, the European Union is a party to 18 percent of
the PTAs (55 in total), but the United States is party to just 3 percent of the
PTAs (10 in total). Figure 9 thus illustrates how the European Union has been
more likely to use PTAs to promote adoption of antitrust law around the
world.
In addition to examining whether the European Union or United States is a
party to a PTA, our dataset allows us to examine whether the antitrust provisions in PTAs include language that is distinctive of either EU antitrust law or
U.S. antitrust law.45 We collected this information because distinctive language may be a proxy for whether the PTA is likely to promote the emulation
of either EU-style or U.S.-style antitrust law within the trading partner's jurisdiction. Similarity in language is a method that has previously been used to
document the diffusion of laws in other contexts, such as how new forms of
regulations spread across U.S. states or how ideas and rights spread across the
world's constitutions. 46
Specifically, we considered PTAs as including distinctively European language if they contained the following phrases that are derived from Articles
101 and 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union or the
European Merger Control Regulation (EMCR):
"

"[agreements that have as their] object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition"

"

"abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position"

"

"concentration is incompatible"

"

"significantly impede effective competition"

"

"creation or strengthening of a dominant position"

4s For a discussion of why these phrases are distinctive to each of these two jurisdictions'
regimes, see Bradford et al., supra note 43.
46 See, e.g., KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOw

(2013); Bradford et al.,
supra note 43; David S. Law, ConstitutionalArchetypes, 95 TEx. L. REV. 153 (2016); Jack L.
Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880
(1969).
HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES
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Additionally, we considered PTAs as including distinctively American language if they contained any of the following phrases derived from Sherman
Act Sections 1 and 2, as well as Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
"

"substantially lessen competition"

"

"every contract, combination"

"

"every person who shall monopolize"

We considered PTAs as including this distinctive language if they included
either the exact or a close approximation of these phrases. For example, we
considered a PTA as including distinctively European language if the phrase
"significantly impede effective competition" appeared in the PTA in a different tense (e.g., "impeded"), or if it appeared as "significantly impede competition," or "impede effective competition."
FIGURE 10:
PTAS WITH DISTINCTIVELY EUROPEAN AND
DISTINCTIVELY AMERICAN LANGUAGE
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Figure 10 reports the share of PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles that
included distinctive language from either EU antitrust law or U.S. antitrust law.
As Figure 10 shows, phrases that are distinctive of EU antitrust law are common
across the PTAs in our sample. Cumulatively, by 2010, 63 percent of the PTAs
that include antitrust chapters or articles include at least one of the five phrases
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that are distinctive of EU laws. The phrases that are distinctive of U.S. laws,
however, are almost entirely absent from PTAs. In fact, only less than 1 percent of
PTAs with antitrust law chapters or articles include any of the distinctive phrases
from U.S. antitrust law.
To further explore this trend, Figure 11 and Figure 12 break out the data based
on whether the European Union and United States were, or were not, parties to the
PTAs containing the relevant distinctive language from their law. Figure 11 shows
that the distinctively European phrases are, unsurprisingly, common in PTAs to
which the European Union was a party. Notably, of the PTAs where the European
Union was a party, 82 percent include distinctively European phrases. But, importantly, these phrases are common even in agreements where the European Union
is not a party. In fact, these distinctively European phrases still appear in 59 percent of PTAs with an antitrust chapter or agreement where the European Union is
not a party. This illustrates how the European antitrust model has spread around
the world. For instance, language that is distinctive of the European Union is
included in the following PTAs: the Baltic Free Trade Area (1993), the Free Trade
Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Lithuania (1995),
and the Association Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey (2004).
FIGURE 11:

PTAS WITH DISTINCTIVELY EUROPEAN LANGUAGE BROKEN
OUT BY EUROPEAN UNION PARTICIPATION
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The patterns in Figure 12, however, are dramatically different. Distinctively
American language only appears in 10 percent of PTAs to which the United
States is a party, and appears in 1 PTA (or 0.3 percent of PTAs) to which the
United States is not a party." In other words, not only have other countries not
spread these distinctively U.S. articulations of antitrust law, but the United
States itself has also hardly done so. These results thus can be interpreted as
illustrating how the European Union has more commonly used trade agreements to export antitrust law principles.
FIGURE 12:

PTAS WITH DISTINCTIVELY AMERICAN LANGUAGE BROKEN
OUT BY UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION
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The one PTA that includes distinctively American language that the United States is not a
part of is the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIIFORUM States and the European Community (2008), which refers to "substantially lessening competition" in the antitrust
chapter of the agreement. Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States,
of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 2008 O.J.
(L 289) 3, 43 (art. 126), eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=oj:L:2008:289:0003:
1955:EN: (the CARIIFORUM states include Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago).
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III. CONCLUSION
This article introduced a new dataset on antitrust provisions in 596 PTAs
signed between 1945 and 2010. While this dataset could be deployed to answer myriad questions, this article has focused on providing a general overview of the extent to which antitrust law is addressed in trade agreements,
examining the types of antitrust provisions that are found in these agreements,
and reporting whether parties make those provisions enforceable by subjecting them to dispute settlement. It also has examined the extent to which governments use trade agreements to curtail discrimination of foreign companies
and to engage in regulatory cooperation in the enforcement of their domestic
antitrust regimes. Finally, it has documented the striking difference in the European Union's frequent use of PTAs to export its antitrust laws to its trading
partners and the United States' reluctance, or failure, to do the same. This
finding may partially explain why the EU-style antitrust laws have diffused
across the world, while the international influence of the U.S. antitrust laws
has dwindled over time. 48
These results are consistent with the view that governments consider antitrust and trade liberalization to be closely interrelated policy areas and frequently seek to deploy PTAs to address a diverse array of antitrust concerns.
However, this brief analysis only scratches the surface of what can be learned
using our new dataset about the global diffusion of antitrust law and about the
antitrust-trade intersection. We hope that future researchers will accept our
invitation to download the data and further study the ways that antitrust law
has been developed and exported through international trade agreements.

48 See Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton & Filippo Maria Lancieri, The Chicago School's Limited
Influence on InternationalAntitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2020); Bradford et al., supra note

43.

